ment of a section 11 claim, courts have applied the liberal notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce dure.5 Rule 8( a)(2) states that a plaintiff must plead only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to re lief."6
The fear of strike suits, which are groundless claims filed as a pre text for discovery in order to induce settlement, has led some courts to interpret the Federal Rules more stringently.7 To dissuade potential plaintiffs or to dispose of more complaints at the pleading stage, these courts have required securities plaintiffs to plead their claims with par ticularity under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 8 Rule 9(b) provides "[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the circum stances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally."9 resolve the existing disagreement among circuits over whether the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b) applies to section 11 complaints. The district court originally dis missed the case, in part, because the plaintiff s (stock purchasers) did not plead fraud with particularity. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part, stating that "Rule 9(b) does not apply to claims under § 11 of the Securities Act, because proof of fraud or mistake is not a prerequisite to establishing liability under § 11." Carlon v. Thaman (In re NationsMart Sec. Litig.), 130 F. 3d 309, 314 (8th Cir. 1997). where fraud is a factor under section 11 is with respect to a defendant ' s right to contribution from other parties who are liable for the misstatement or omission. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77k(f)(l) (1994) ("Every person who becomes liable to make any payment under this section may recover contribution ... from any person who ... would have been liable to make the same payment, unless the person who has become liable was, and the other was not, guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation.").
6. FED. R. Crv. P. 8(a)(2).
7. See, e.g., Melder v. Morris, 27 F. 3d 1097, 1100 (5th Cir. 1994) (applying FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) to a section 11 claim); see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975) (expressing concern that strike suits, which take up the time of a large number of people in the hopes of increasing the settlement value, represent "a social cost rather than a benefit").
8. See Melder, 27 F.3d at 1100 (applying FED. R. Crv. P. 9(b) to a section 11 claim "grounded in fraud" and noting that "the heightened pleading standard provides defendants with fair notice of the plaintiff's claims, protects defendants from harm to their reputation and goodwill, reduces the number of strike suits, and prevents plaintiffs from filing baseless claims then attempting to discover unknown wrongs" (quoting Tuchman v. DSC Communi cations Corp. , 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994)).
9. FED. R. Crv. P. 9(b). Averments of mistake occur only infrequently. This Note, therefore, will only address the relationship between section 11 and claims of fraud. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 959 F.2d 677, 683 (7th Cir. 1992 ) (collecting a mere two cases in the last fifty years in which a court dismissed a complaint for failure to plead mistake with particularity); 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE' S FEDERAL The courts that have addressed whether section 11 plaintiffs must plead according to the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b) have taken three approaches: (1) Rule 9(b) does not apply to any section 11 claims;10 (2) Rule 9(b) applies to only those section 11 claims that are "grounded in fraud";11 and (3) Rule 9(b) applies to all section 11 claims.1 2 Whether a section 11 plaintiff must plead his or her claim in accordance with Rule 9(b) affects a buyer's substantive rights under the securities laws and interferes with the regulatory scheme of the se curities markets established by Congress.13 This Note argues that Rule 9(b) does not apply to claims filed un der section 11 of the Securities Act, regardless of whether the claim "is grounded in fraud." Instead, section 11 plaintiffs must comply only with the liberal notice pleading standard stated in Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Part I argues that Congress inten tionally set a low burden for section 11 plaintiffs because the purpose of the Securities Act is to protect purchasers of securities. The text, history, and purpose of the Securities Act, as well as the text and pur pose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, support imposing mini mal pleading requirements on section 11 plaintiffs. Because securities lawsuits often contain claims under both section 11 of the Securities Act and section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Ex- Cir. 1992) . These courts generally find that because plaintiffs incorporate section 11 and section lO(b) claims in the same complaint based on the same facts, both claims necessarily sound in fraud. See Shapiro, 964 F.2d at 287 {"Although Count II does not allege fraudulent intent or recklessness (a prerequisite to a successful fraud claim), neither does it allege negligence."). On the other hand, some courts have recognized that applying Rule 9{b) to section 11 claims accomplishes nothing except eliminating fraud from the complaint. See, e.g. , NationsMart, 130 F.3d at 314.
12 See Sears v. Likens, 912 F.2d 889 {7th Cir. 1990 ) {holding that Rule 9{b) applies to section 12{2) of the Securities Act, but not distinguishing between negligent or fraudulent clainls); see also NationsMart, 130 F.3d at 315 (citing to Sears when discussing whether to apply Rule 9{b) to a section 11 claim even though Sears dealt with section 12(2)). Like sec tion 11, section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act creates a private cause of action against sellers for material misstatements or omissions in registration statements. Section 12{a){2), how ever, has been strictly limited by the loss causation defense in section 12(b) and the Supreme Court's finding in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 {1995) that section 12(a)(2) does not apply to secondary transactions or private offerings.
13. See infra notes 21-23, 40-43 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 98:2395 change Act"),14 Part II posits that differences in statutory language and policy goals in these sections mandate applying a lower pleading standard to claims filed under section 11 than to those filed under sec tion lO (b) .15 This Note concludes that Rule 8(a)(2) should apply to section 11 claims because applying the heightened requirements of Rule 9(b) would undermine section ll's inducement to carefully pre pare registration statements in order to inform buyers of the character of securities.16
I. SECTION 11 PLACES A MINIMAL BURDEN ON PLAINTIFFS
The statutory language and legislative history of the Securities Act indicate that Congress intended to minimize plaintiffs' burden of pleading under section 11. Section I.A argues that because section 11 does not specifically mention fraud or mistake, Rule 9(b) does not ap ply. Section I.B recounts the historical facts that prompted Congress to enact the Securities Act and argues that the purpose behind the Se curities Act and section 11 in particular support a minimal pleading standard. Section I.C analyzes the purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and concludes that because the policy reasons sup porting Rule 9(b) do not apply to section 11 claims, such claims should be pleaded in accordance with Rule 8(a)(2).
A. Statutory Language of Section 11
Because the text of section 11 imposes a minimal burden on the buyer, it would contravene congressional intent to read the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b) into section 11 claims. This Section ar gues that there are two reasons on the face of the statute to apply the notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2) to section 11 claims. First, because the plain language of section 11 does not include fraud or mis take as an element of the claim, the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b) does not apply; and therefore, by default, the liberal notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2) applies. Second, section ll's inap posite treatment of buyers and sellers also supports imposing the lib eral notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2) on section 11 plaintiffs.
14. See, e.g., In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696 {3d Cir. 1996) . Section lO{b) of the Exchange Act provides civil liability for fraudulent statements in connection with the sale of securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78j{b) {1994). The plain language of section 11 supports requiring a plaintiff to comply with the more liberal notice pleading standard because section 11 does not include fraud or mistake as an element of the claim.
When interpreting a statute, the Supreme Court has instructed lower courts that "[w]here ... resolution of a question of federal law turns on a statute and the intention of Congress, we look first to the statu tory language and then to the legislative history if the statutory lan guage is unclear.m7 In this case, the Federal Rules and the statute are clear. 1 8 Rule 9(b) imposes a heightened pleading standard in only two instances: averments of fraud or mistake.19 Because section 11 in cludes neither of these, it does not fall within the scope of Rule 9(b ).20
To plead a claim under section 11, the plaintiff must allege the following: (1) that the registration statement contained a misstate ment or omission when it became effective; (2) that the misstatement or omission was material; and (3) that the plaintiff purchased the secu rity pursuant to such statement.21 After establishing a prima fade case, the plaintiff may recover damages. 23. Section 13 of the Securities Act provides the statute of limitations applicable to sec tion 11 claims. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1994) (providing for a statutory limitations period of one year after discovery of the misstatement or omission, or after discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence, but in no event can a section 11 action be brought more than three years after the security was "bona fide offered to the public").
[ Vol. 98:2395 Whether the claim is "grounded in fraud" should not affect what a section 11 plaintiff must plead in the complaint. By definition, fraud is "a knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a mate rial fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment."24 Section 11 does not require proof of scienter or reliance;25 therefore, it is mean ingless to distinguish cases upon whether or not they are "grounded in fraud." Allegations of fraud would be mere surplusage and could be deleted from the complaint by the plaintiff before filing the complaint, or by the court upon a motion to dismiss, without affecting the plain tiff's substantive claim.26 Even if a court dismissed the allegations of fraud from the plaintiff's complaint for failure to plead with particu larity under Rule 9(b ), the heart of a plaintiff's section 11 claim-that the registration statement contained false or misleading information -should not be dismissed. 31. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168 (holding that homeowners, who brought a civil rights action against municipal officials claiming that a search of their homes for illegal drugs vio lated the Fourth Amendment, did not need to comply with the heightened pleading standard because courts may impose the heightened pleading standard only in circumstances consti-to say, "perhaps if Rules 8 and 9 were rewritten today, [additional claims] might be subjected to the added specificity requirement of Rule 9(b)."32 But because Rule 9(b) applies a heightened pleading standard only to averments of fraud or mistake and not to cases in volving a material misstatement or omission, it should not be ex panded to apply to section 11 claims.33 An analysis of the treatment of buyers and sellers under section 11 further supports a minimal pleading standard for section 11 plaintiffs.
Section 11 treats buyers and sellers differently by mandating minimal requirements for a plaintiff's prima facie case, but requiring strict compliance with the Securities Act's disclosure provisions and reason able investigation for a defendant to raise an affirm ative defense.34
Congress made it easy for buyers to bring a claim under section 11.
To state a claim, a buyer must allege that he purchased a security from a seller pursuant to a registration statement containing a material mis 34. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983) (stating that sec tion 11 "places a relatively minimal burden on a plaintiff''); see also id. at 383 (stating that the liability for the issuer of a materially misleading registration statement is "virtually ab solute, even for innocent misstatements" and that anyone else who signed the registration statement must prove, after reasonable investigation, that he or she had reasonable grounds to believe the statement was not materially misleading (footnotes omitted)); H.R. REP. No. [I]t is the general rule in the federal courts that, when the very statute which creates the cause of action also contains a limitation period, the statute of limitations not only bars the remedy but also destroys the liability, and therefore the plaintiff must plead and prove facts showing that he is within the statute. This view has been consistently followed under the Se curities Act.
Id. at 695 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
36. Even if a person purchases the security after it has been made generally available to the public, the added requirement of proof of reliance on the untrue statement in the regis tration statement "may be established without proof of the reading of the registration state-[Vol. 98:2395 buyer may recover damages for an innocent misstatement or omis sion.37 Representative Sam Rayburn emphasized the importance of the absence of a scienter requirement in the legislative history of the Securities Act when he stated that, "[e]very lawyer knows that with all the facts in the control of the [seller] it is practically impossible for a buyer to prove a state of knowledge or a failure to exercise due care on the part of the [seller] ."38 Therefore, it would be unreasonable to require a buyer to plead with particularity if the buyer did not even have to read the registration statement to recover in the first place.39
In addition, Congress granted buyers procedural control over sec tion 11 litigation. First, a buyer can elect to bring a section 11 claim in law or equity.4 0 While the damages sought usually command the deci sion between law and equity, the choice effectively grants the buyer the choice of trial by judge or jury.4 1 A buyer also has the option of suing in federal or state court.4 2 Moreover, under an express exception to the general removal statute, a seller may not remove a section 11
claim from state to federal court.4 3 Sellers should not be able to un dermine buyers' ability to bring their claims in the most favorable ju risdiction by easily having a section 11 claim dismissed for failure to plead with particularity. The statutory language shows that Congress did not want a seller to be able to evade the disclosure regime of the Securities Act because the buyer did not comply with the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b ).4 4 Congress divided "sellers" into two categories: the issuer and ment by such person." 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994); see also III LOUIS Loss, SECURmES REGULATION, 1752 (2d ed. 1961) (stating that section 11 enables a plaintiff to establish reli ance "without proof of the plaintiff's reading" of the registration statement). This rule makes perfect sense if one accepts the "efficient market hypothesis (EMH). " The EMH says that the price of a security inlmediately reflects all disclosed information about the secu rity. See generally Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Em· pirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970). Therefore, if an issuer discloses a material misstatement of information, the price of the security will reflect this misinformation. The purchaser will pay an unfair price regardless of whether or not she has read the registration statement. everyone else involved in preparing the registration statement.45 First, the Supreme Court has held that liability of the issuer is virtually ab solute.46 Near absolute liability forces the issuer to assume responsi bility for all misstatements or omissions because "to impose a lesser responsibility would nullify the purpose of [the Securities Act]," which is to ensure full disclosure of securities to the public.47 Second, other individuals preparing or signing the registration statement may ab solve themselves of liability only by demonstrating that he or she did not know or could not have discovered, through the exercise of rea sonable care, that the registration statement contained a material mis statement or omitted a material fact.48 The Congressional Record noted that "[u]nless responsibility is to involve merely paper liability it is necessary to throw the burden of disproving responsibility for rep rehensible acts of omission or commission on those who purport to is sue statements for the public's reliance."49 The text of section 11, as well as the legislative history, clearly places the burden of providing disclosure and proving exemption on the seller, not the buyer; and therefore, the liberal notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2) should apply to buyers' claims under section 11.
B. History and Purpose of the Securities Act
The legislative history of the Securities Act supports imposing minimal pleading requirements on section 11 plaintiffs. Section LB argues that the impetus for the creation of the Securities Act and sec tion 11, as well as the combined purpose of the Securities Act and sec tion 11, support applying the liberal notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) to section 11 claims.
The events precipitating the enactment of the Securities Act un derscore the significance of the protection of buyers through the civil liability provisions of the Act, induding section 11. In response to these conditions, President Franklin D. [Vol. 98:2395
United States' financial markets by imposing high levels of civil liabil ity upon sellers of securities.so During the decade following World War I, Americans purchased $50 billion worth of new-issue securi ties.s1 Unfortunately, one-half of those securities turned out to have little or no value.s2 There were two interdependent causes of this widespread purchase of valueless securities. First, to effectuate securi ties sales, high-pressure salesmen promised Americans easy wealth without educating them regarding the facts necessary to estimate the value of the securities.s3 Second, sellers convinced industries to meet the high demand for securities by accepting capital for unnecessary expansion purposes.s4 New securities were issued for public consump tion, not to finance justifiable industrial growth.ss As a consequence, many families lost their life savings in the stock market crash of 1929.56 At that time, the United States was "farther behind than any other civilized nation . . . with respect to preserving the rights of the pur chasers of securities. "s7.
The goals of the Securities Act in general, and section 11 in par ticular, favor applying the liberal notice pleading standard to section 11 claims. The Securities Act imposes more responsibility on the [T]he necessity for this legislation to help restore confidence in our local banking institutions is great .... There is a peculiar fact with respect to such investments in that the corporation that issues the securities knows more about them than anyone else, and the old rule of caveat emptor, or the buyer beware, certainly should not apply to this character of investments.
The man who sells them ought to give the facts, and the Government ought to require the is suer of securities to give all the facts, and be honest with the public. seller than the buyer of registered securities.�8 The purpose of the Se curities Act is to. provide greater protection to purchasers of registered securities by requiring sellers to "provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails."59 In short, the aim of the Securities Act is to pro tect buyers by discouraging misleading statements. In contrast to the traditional contractual idea of cavea. t emptor, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt emphasized that under the Securities Act "the seller [must] also beware."60 Therefore, placing a lower burden on section 11 plain tiffs effectuates the purpose of the Securities Act: protection of the buyer at the expense of the seller.
To protect buyers through full and accurate disclosure, section 11 imposes civil liability with stringent penalties for false or misleading statements.61 Section 11 provides for joint and several liability for every person who prepares and/or signs registration statements.62 Sec tion 11 creates an incentive for sellers to comply with the Securities Act by imposing virtually absolute liability on parties directly involved in a registered offering for misstatements or omissions in the registra tion statement.63 According to the economic theory upon which secu rities regulation is premised, any misstatement or omission tends to over-or understate the price of a security, making all purchasers vic tims of the misstatement.64 By imposing more responsibility on sellers and providing for virtually absolute liability for material misstate ments, it is clear that Congress intended to discourage material mis-58. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in recommending the Securities Act, said that it "puts the burden of telling the whole truth on the seller." H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, supra note 1, at 2. Also note that the President did not mention fraud when recommending the Securi ties Act. See id. at l-2.
59. H.R. 5480, 73d Cong. § 1 (1933) . President Franklin D. Roosevelt, however, specifi cally stated that "the Federal Government cannot and should not take any action which might be construed as approving or guaranteeing that newly issued securities are sound in the sense that their value will be maintained or that the properties which they represent will earn profit." H.R. Not only do the history and purpose of section 11 favor a lesser pleading standard, but the policy goals of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also dictate that the notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2), not the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b), apply to section 11 claims. Section I.C argues that because the policy ration ales behind Rule 9(b) are not relevant to section 11 claims and be cause the policy rationales for Rule 8(a)(2) do apply, Rule 8(a)(2) should govern section 11 claims.
None of the policy arguments justify applying a heightened plead ing standard to section 11 claims. Traditionally, courts state that a heightened pleading requirement serves the following functions: (1) to provide notice to the defendant and allows the defendant to pre pare a response; (2) to protect a defendant's reputation from the dam age of charges involving some degree of moral turpitude; and (3) to minimize the impact of strike suits.66
The first argument, that a heightened pleading standard provides the defendant with sufficient notice to prepare an effective response, is not persuasive. Rule 9(b) would be mere surplusage if its only func tion were to notify defendants of the plaintiff's claims, which Rule 8( a) already requires.67 While the heightened requirements of Rule 9(b) provide more specific notice, courts have not required more particu larized notice in a section 11 action.68 For example, in In re Bank America Corporation Securities Litigation,69 the plaintiff alleged that the issuer (a bank) violated section 11 by falsely characterizing its merger with another bank as a "merger of equals" in its registration statement.70 The court allowed the plaintiffs to support their claim - that the banks never intended the transaction to be a "merger of equals" -with anonymous quotes from The Wall Street Journal. 11 Very little is required to comply with Rule 8(a)(2). Therefore, the no tice requirement does not support requiring section 11 plaintiffs to plead their claims with particularity.72 Rule 8(a)(2) provides a defen dant with sufficient notice of the charges against him. 73 Furthermore, other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide pro tection for the defendant if the complaint fails to provide adequate no tice. The defendant may move for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e).74 The defendant may also file a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which would force the plaintiff to explain her claim or have the case dismissed.75 Finally, the defendant could file a Rule 56(c) motion for summ ary judgment that would com pel the plaintiff to respond or lose her claim.76
Likewise, the second argument that is typically given to support a heightened pleading standard, protecting the defendant's reputation, does not support applying this standard to section 11 claims for two reasons. First, a section 11 claim does not involve the type of moral turpitude that may tarnish a defendant's reputation.77 Because a de fendant may be found liable under section 11 for a completely inno cent misstatement or omission,78 section 11 does not harm a defen dant's reputation sufficiently to justify the application of Rule 9(b ).79 Second, even if a section 11 lawsuit causes damage to the defen dant's reputation, any harm that accrues to a defendant's reputation from a violation of the Securities Act is an effect implicitly intended by Congress to further compliance with the securities laws.80 Because every lawsuit has the potential to tarnish the defendant's reputation, the mere possibility of harm to a defendant's reputation does not sup port applying the heightened pleading standard to section 11 claims.81 Courts have held that "only a defendant facing the particular threat that is posed by an accusation of fraud may invoke the protection of Rule 9(b )."82 Congress intended section 11 to ensure compliance with the disclosure requirements of the Securities Act and to make the public aware of sellers who did not comply with its requirements.83
The third and final common rationale for applying a heightened pleading standard, deterring strike suits, must also fail because Con gress designed section 11 to encourage meticulous preparation of reg istration statements.84 Because Congress addressed the possibility of strike suits in the context of a section 11 claim by providing for attor neys' fees and costs, imposition of the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b) would be redundant.85 Further, because section 11 provides other procedural protections against strike suits,86 imposing a height ened pleading standard would do nothing more than place a more on erous burden on plaintiffs than Congress intended. In enacting section 11, Congress did not seek to minimize frivolous lawsuits, but instead wanted to ensure compliance with its disclosure requirements by placing virtually absolute liability on sellers in order to discourage misleading disclosures.� General public policy considerations also favor applying Rule 8(a)(2) rather than Rule 9(b) to section 11 claims. Since Rule 9(b) does not provide an explicit standard for determining what details must be included in a complaint, applying the heightened pleading standard may create confusion.88 Plaintiffs' lawyers may produce pro lix complaints that would increase costs and burden the courts.89 More importantly, judicial uncertainty may lead to unfair dismissals, under mine the purpose of the Securities Act, and allow issuers to sell securi ties with materially misleading registration statements, which in turn will decrease the faith of investors in the United States' securities markets. 90 The text and purpose of the Securities Act and the policies em bedded in the Federal Rules support imposing the liberal notice pleading standard on section 11 plaintiffs. Because the plain language of section 11 does not include fraud or mistake, courts should not ap ply the heightened pleading standard to section 11 claims. Further more, the purpose of section 11 -to ensure compliance with the dis closure requirements of the Securities Act -mandates a minimal pleading standard for the plaintiff and a correspondingly heavier bur den for the defendant. Finally, the policy rationales behind Rule 9(b) do not apply to section 11 claims because the Securities Act provides other procedural protections to serve these goals. . While a heightened pleading standard may be needed to limit section 10(b) claims, it is not required to limit section 11 claims. Second, unlike those of section 10(b ), section 11 claims do not require proof of scien ter and reliance; therefore, courts should not impose the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b) on section 11 plaintiff s. Finally, be cause section 11 provides additional procedural protections that per form the same screening functions as a heightened pleading standard, it makes sense to apply a heightened pleading standard to claims filed under section lO(b) but not to those filed under section 11.
II. C OMPARISON OF S ECTION
The statutory language qf section 10(b) and section 11 supports the argument that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) should apply only to section lO(b) claims. First, section 11 provides an express private action, whereas under section lO(b ), the cause of action is implied. 93 The express-versus-implied distinction is important because courts in terpret the statutory language of section 11 to limit claims in three ways: (1) to constrain the range of potential plaintiffs; (2) to limit the reach of possible defendants; and (3) to lessen the kinds of documents covered by the rule.94 By contrast, the judicially created cause of ac tion under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-595 constitutes a "catchall" antifraud provision. overrestrict relief to buyers, thus frustrating congressional intent in enacting section 11.
Section 11 enumerates a limited range of potential defendants, 1 06 while section 10(b) does not.107 Because the heightened pleading re quirements of Rule 9(b) may be required to provide adequate notice to defendants, it is significant that section 11 lists all possible defen dants and their connection to the registration statement.103 Because the class of defendants is limited, a complaint complying with the re quirements of Rule 8(a)(2) provides sufficient notice to all defendants. Section 10(b ), however, provides a vague reference to conceivable de fendants.109 A section 10(b) plaintiff may have purchased the security in the second-hand market, and may even have a claim against some one other than the issuer.110 Therefore, Rule 9(b) is necessary to en sure adequate notice to section 10(b) defendants.
The statute limits section 11 claims to material misstatements or omissions in registration statements.111 Section 10(b) claims, however, may be based on material misstatements or omissions in other docu ments, or oral communications.112 The Exchange Act requires section 10(b) plaintiff s alleging a misleading statement or omission to "specify each statement alleged to have been misleading [and] tential bases for a section lO(b) claim may justify applying the height ened pleading standard. It is easier to determine the merits of a sec tion 11 complaint because it requires a court to focus on only the regis tration statement and not on other documents or forms of communication.
Not only is there a difference in scope between the sections, the elements comprising section 11 and section lO(b) claims differ. Be cause section 11, unlike section lO(b ), does not require the plaintiff to specify "the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading,"11 4 pleading with particularity under Rule 9(b) should be limited to sec tion lO(b) claims. Section 11 does not require proof of reliance115 be cause the Securities Act presumes causation between a material mis statement or omission and the market price, so section 11 plaintiffs do not have to specifically plead that they read the registration state ment.116 Section lO(b ), in contrast, requires th� plaintiff to prove rea sonable reliance and causation; therefore, application of a heightened pleading standard is important to ensure compliance with these ele ments.117 Finally, section 11 does not include a scienter requirement, while section lO(b) does.118 Because a section 11 plaintiff does not have to show intent to defraud, Rule 9(b) does not apply.
A final distinction between the two sections is that section 11 and section 10(b) provide different procedural protections against frivo lous lawsuits. Accordingly, it is reasonable to apply different pleading requirements to the plaintiffs. Instead of using a heightened pleading standard to deter frivolous lawsuits, courts, in their discretion, may re quire section 11 plaintiffs to post bond to cover the costs of the law suit.119 The bond requirement may deter frivolous suits because plain tiffs will not post bond for cases that they cannot win. This procedural [Vol. 98:2395 restriction serves the same purpose as a heightened pleading standard: to deter frivolous lawsuits.
In sum, even though section 11 and section 10(b) overlap in some respects, they represent distinct causes of action;120 and therefore, it is reasonable to apply a different pleading standard to each section.
B. Impact of Recent Congressional Activity
Congress specifically addressed the pleading standard for claims brought under section 10(b) in both the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA") and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 ("SUSA"). 121 Neither of the two recent Acts affect the pleading standard for claims filed under section 11 of the Securities Act.122 Because the legislative history of the PSLRA and SUSA illustrates congressional awareness of judicial confusion over the pleading standard for securities cases, it is significant that Congress addressed the pleading standard under section 10(b) but not under section 11.123 The PSLRA altered the procedure, but not the sub stance, of securities fraud cases.124 While legislative inaction has been criticized as a canon of statutory construction, "legislative action by amendment . . . with respect to other parts of a law which have re ceived a contemporaneous and practical construction may indicate approval of interpretations pertaining to the unchanged and unaf-fected parts of the law."125 In enacting the PSLRA and SUSA, Con gress could have, but did not, address the pleading standard applicable to claims filed under section 11.
Some courts have indicated that the same policy considerations that favor applying Rule 9(b) to section 10(b) claims apply to section 11.126 When Congress altered the requirements for pleading a section 10(b) securities fraud claim under the Exchange Act, it did not change the pleading standard under section 11.127 The changes included the following section:
Requiring that scienter be pied with particularity.
The obj ective: To provide filter at the pleading stage to screen out alle gations that have no factual basis; To provide clearer statement of plain tiffs ' claims and scope of the case; To encourage attorneys to use greater care in drafting their complaints; Make it easier to win motions to dismiss frivolous cases by requiring that scienter be pied with particularity. Eliminate the split among Circuits dealing with pleading requirements for scienter. To codify the requirements in the 2nd and 7th Circuits.128
Congress's explicit invocation of Rule 9(b) in section 10(b ), coupled with the failure to similarly address section 11, demonstrates that Congress did not intend Rule 9(b) to apply to section 11 claims.129 As stated in the text of the Act, the PSLRA was designed, in part, to re solve disagreement among circuits over the pleading requirements for section 10(b) claims.130 During this same time period, and in many of the same cases, a circuit split existed regarding the application of Rule 9(b) to section 11.131 Because scienter is not an element of a section 11 claim, and the PSLRA does not affect section 11, judges should not read fraud into section 11 claims by requiring plaintiffs to plead with particularity.13 2 Similarly, in November 1998, Congress enacted SUSA to resolve the continuing confusion regarding the pleading standard for section 10(b) claims.133 Li ke the PSLRA, SUSA did not address the pleading standard for section 11 of the Securities Act.134 Until Congress specifi cally addresses the pleading standard applicable to section 11 claims, plaintiffs need only plead according to Rule 8(a)(2).
As illustrated in this Part, section 11 and section 10(b) differ greatly in both statutory language and purpose. These differences dic tate that the liberal notice pleading standard should continue to apply to section 11 claims, while the heightened pleading standard should apply to section 10(b) claims as mandated by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 .
C ONCLUSION
Section 11 plaintiffs should be required to plead their claims ac cording to the liberal notice pleading standard enumerated in Rule 8(a)(2). Congress intentionally placed a low burden on section 11 plaintiffs to facilitate full and fair disclosure of securities. Without civil liability, issuers will not comply with the Securities Act and the United States financial markets will suffer. Defendants should not be able to avoid liability by easily dismissing a section 11 complaint for failure to plead with particularity.
The differences in statutory language and legislative history of sec tion 11 and section lO(b) support applying a lower pleading standard to section 11 than to section lO(b) claims. Congress expressly directed section lO(b) of the Exchange Act, but not section 11 of the Securities Act, at fraudulent securities transactions. Congress recently reempha sized the fact that the heightened pleading standard applies to securi ties fraud cases under section lO(b) but not to claims under section 11 when it enacted the PSLRA and SUSA. To protect investors and the integrity of the regulatory scheme, Rule 8(a)(2) should apply to sec tion 11 claims.
